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14. ABSTRACT Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the necessity for commanders to understand the operational environment (i.e. the culture, geography, key actors, allies, the enemy, potential allies or foes, and the character of warfare) and then adapt in order to be successful. Understanding the operational environment is essential to planning and executing a successful operation. The French and Indian War was fought in as complex operational environment as can be imagined. The terrain, the type of warfare, the cultural differences between the participants was not like Europe. In July 1755, General Edward Braddock's army was soundly defeated by the French and their Indian allies on the banks of the Monongahela. Three years later, in 1758, General John Forbes's army captured Fort Duquesne. The two British campaigns to capture Fort Duquesne highlight the necessity for the commander to understand the theatre, the terrain, the enemy, potential allies, and the importance of logistical and intelligence considerations in planning. General Braddock failed to understand the operational environment and was defeated. General Forbes did understand it and was successful.				
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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**Two Expeditions to Capture Fort Duquesne: A Study in Understanding the Operational
Environment and Attendant Failure (1755) and Success (1758)**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Two Expeditions to Capture Fort Duquesne: A Study in Understanding the Operational Environment and Attendant Failure (1755) and Success (1758)

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Thesis: The British defeat during the 1755 expedition to capture Fort Duquesne stemmed from a failure in operational planning. Three years later with the same objective, but with a better understanding of the operating environment, the British captured Fort Duquesne because of a better understanding of the enemy, the type of warfare, successful diplomacy, reliable intelligence, and a comprehensive logistical plan.

Discussion: Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the necessity for commanders to understand the operational environment (i.e. the culture, geography, key actors, allies, the enemy, potential allies or foes, and the character of warfare) and then adapt in order to be successful. The study of history allows current military professionals the ability to examine past operations and draw lessons learned that can be applied in the future. The French and Indian War fought in North America from 1755-1760 occurred in a complex operational environment as can be imagined. The terrain, the type of warfare, the cultural differences between the participants was not like Europe. This paper will examine, through comparing and contrasting, two British expeditions focusing on the following operational elements: The commanders, theater environment, intelligence, logistics planning, and diplomacy.

In July 1755, General Edward Braddock's army was soundly defeated by the French and their Indian allies on the banks of the Monongahela. Braddock's expedition to capture Fort Duquesne failed because he did not understand the operational environment: the character of frontier warfare in North America, the Indians as foes and allies and thus he failed diplomatically to gain their support, the physical terrain in which his force had to operate and consequently failed to build a logistical plan to support his operation, and the all of the local and experienced colonists who offered advise but he were not heeded.

Three years later, in 1758, General John Forbes's army captured Fort Duquesne. Forbes expedition was successful because he understood the operational environment and was able to adapt his planning and execution. He understood the character of frontier warfare and trained his men to conduct it. He comprehended the importance of the Indians and succeeded diplomatically to deny the French their support; and he understood the physical terrain and built a logistical plan to support and sustain his operation. Ultimately, through prior planning he set the conditions for success before the first movement of his troops toward the objective.

Conclusion: Understanding the operational environment is essential to planning and executing a successful operation. The two British campaigns to capture Fort Duquesne highlight the necessity for the commander to understand the theatre, the terrain, the enemy, potential allies, and the need logistical and intelligence considerations in planning. General Braddock failed to understand the operational environment and was defeated. General Forbes did understand it and was successful.

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Preface

Since I was a boy, early American history has interested me. The stories and tales associated with our nation's birth from Paul Revere and his famous ride, George Washington bravely crossing the Delaware River, and Francis Marion harassing the British Army in the Carolina swamps, to Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and other founding fathers became etched into my memory and provided ample inspiration for my young imagination. Years later, James Fennimore Cooper's first book in the Leatherstockings Series, *The Pioneers* (1823), purchased randomly at a garage sale, rekindled the fire my interest in early American history, specifically for the pre-Revolutionary period that was before unknown to me.

The French and Indian War is important from an historical standpoint for several reasons. First, it sparked a struggle between the two most powerful imperial states with their global empires; hence many historians considered it the first true world war. Second, it tipped the balance of power in North America, propelling the British to dominance of its whole and significantly eliminated the French colonial military and governing presence. Lastly, and more importantly from a military studies aspect, the conflict was complicated and complex, just as in the 21st century: harsh operating environments (i.e. an untamed wilderness), numerous and powerful indigenous groups, and the semi-supportive colonial governments. Thus, military forces clashing on contested frontiers posed problems for the commanders that required adaptive and unique answers. The operating factors faced in the French and Indian war have real world relevance today. While occurring over 250 years ago, the problem solving, failed and successful adaptation amidst a complex operating environment, closely parallels the diverse environments facing the United States military and civilian officials around the world. Lessons learned from

analyzing how the British recognized the problems and effectually overcame challenges can provide insight for our military leaders in the future.

In selecting a specific topic for analysis, I read and listened to the audio version of Fred Anderson's book, *The War that made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War* (2005). His succinct history of the war allowed me to browse the significant events and select one that peaked my interest. The events surrounding the initial British response after the French defeated George Washington at Fort Necessity and remained in the Ohio valley interested me. I then wanted to understand the underlying causes for General Edward Braddock's monumental defeat of 1755. After conducting further research on Braddock's defeat, Next, I became interested in how General John Forbes learned from Braddock's, adapted, and subsequently was able to capture Fort Duquesne three years later.

What can a 21st century military professional learn from an 18th century war that nearly no one except historians study? Any assessment of previous military operations provides military professionals the ability to learn and build perspective for problems faced on the battlefield from those who once planned and executed. The French and Indian war from the British standpoint provided an environment as complex as any that could be imagined. North America was a strange land with an alien operating environment, an experienced colonial foe with a different way of warfare, culturally different sets of indigenous tribes that served as allies and foes, and a somewhat reluctant local and fragmented populace not fully supporting the war. These were the conditions in which Generals Braddock and Forbes planned and executed their expeditions. Their understanding or lack of thereof of the operational environment effected both their decisions and the ultimate differing outcomes of their operations. The study and analysis of

these two expeditions to capture Fort Duquesne provide many opportunities to examine a complex problem, a multifaceted operating environment, and the necessity of adaptability.

My analysis will focus specifically on Braddock and Forbes's expeditions from the time each was appointed commander to their deaths, - from planning to respective defeat (1755) and victory (1758). Additional background information is included to provide an understanding of the political, military, and physical environment surrounding each operation. The paper will only deal with events in North America, specifically Virginia and Pennsylvania and thus does not include any commentary of other areas of operation on the continent or the European, Caribbean or India theatres of the Seven Years' War. In analyzing Braddock's and Forbes' expeditions, the interpretive prism will be from a current doctrinal perspective and from my own professional experiences. This prism of analysis simply imposes a 21st century one in order to better understand what was not done and what was done in the 18th century.

In selection of my sources, I started by reviewing works by Fred Anderson and Walter Borneman. Using these author's bibliographies as a guide book for research, I soon found Howard Peckman's *The Colonial War, Wolfe and Montcalm* by Francis Parkman, *Braddock at the Monongahela* by Paul Kopperman, and *Guns at the Forks* by Walter O'Meara. With these titles as the basis for information and research, I next used the journal database JSTOR to browse the large amount of scholarly journals for research on either Braddock's or Forbes's expedition. JSTOR introduced me to the works of Stanley Pargellis, Niles Anderson, Paul Gibbens, and Robert Yaple. These men provided great insight and analysis from mostly primary sources, both from participants of the expeditions or newspapers from the time. The information in these journals was essential to the drafting of this paper.

In completing this project, first I wish to acknowledge my wife, Laura. Her support along the way in all aspects of my life, personal and professional, is the only way I have been able to achieve the degree of success I have so far. I would also like to acknowledge the support of my Marine Corps University Master's Thesis mentor, Dr. Donald F. Bittner. Throughout the process, he provided me with excellent advice and I have benefited from his wise counsel and guidance. Thank you for your guidance and assistance.

Introduction

The site of present day Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania is where the Ohio, Allegheny, and Monongahela Rivers converge. Near here occurred one of the worst defeats in British military history. Then, three years later, the same ground would be site to one of the British army's most adaptive victories in the war for America. The commanders that planned and led these expeditions would be forever remembered for what they did and did not do in the wilderness of Pennsylvania. Each would perish following their expeditions and each eulogized in very different ways. Following the initial defeat in 1755, the French would remain in possession of the Ohio valley region for the next three years. It would take a second British expedition in 1758 to capture the French position at Fort Duquesne, later Fort Pitt, on the site at the forks of the Ohio River and thus dominance of the Ohio country.

British expeditions to capture Fort Duquesne during the French and Indian war highlight the necessity for a commander to appreciate the operating environment and then properly adapt in order to plan and execute an effective campaign. The British defeat during the 1755 expedition to capture Fort Duquesne stemmed from a failure to do this. Three years later with the same objective but with a better appreciation of the operational environment, the British did so and were successful.

Operating Environment and Adaptability

Failures by the United States military in Iraq and Afghanistan have facilitated renewed interest and study in the necessity to understand the operating environment and the tragic effects that ensue when such analysis is incorrect. The Department of Defense Field Manual (FM) 1-02, *Operational Terms and Graphics*, defined operational environment as “a composite of the

conditions, circumstances and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander.”¹ This definition is timeless; thus, the concept can be applied to the British experiences in North America during the French and Indian War.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-1, *the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP)* addresses the importance of understanding the operating environment. Understanding the operational environment is a vital part of the first step in the MCPP problem framing.

MCWP 5-1 emphasizes, “understanding the environment provides background information, facts, status, connections, relevant actors, habitat, local beliefs, and a broad range of other factors that serve as context for the commander and his staff to better understand the problem.”² Analysis of the operational environment also includes examination of the culture, language, demographics, geography, key actors, and relationships. By understanding the environment, the commander and his staff can properly adapt in planning and execution.

Adaptation to the environment in Iraq and Afghanistan proved essential to operational successes. The United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in December 2012 published TRADOC pamphlet 525-3-0, *The United States Army Capstone Concept (ACC)*. This document addresses the Army’s view of the operating environment of the future. At its center, “ACC retains the idea of operational adaptability as the fundamental characteristic of the Army required to execute a wide variety of missions.”³ ACC continues, “The fundamental characteristic of the Army necessary to provide decisive landpower is operational adaptability -- the ability of Army leaders, Soldiers, and civilians to shape conditions and respond effectively to a broad range of missions and changing threats and situations with appropriate, flexible, and responsive capabilities.”⁴ The concept of operational adaptability and its importance are not

new. The failure and the success of the British in capturing Fort Duquesne were partly due to the commander's inability or ability to adapt.

The French and Indian war from the British standpoint provided an environment as complex as any that could be imagined. North America was a strange land with an alien operating environment, experienced and allied colonial foes with a different way of war, culturally different sets of tribes that served as allies and enemies, and a somewhat reluctant populace not fully engaged in the war. These were the conditions in which General Edward Braddock and General John Forbes planned and executed their expeditions. How they understood the operational environment effected both their decisions and the ultimate outcomes of their operations. For the military professional, assessing the two expeditions to capture Fort Duquesne provides many opportunities to examine a complex problem, a multifaceted operating environment, the necessity of adaptability, and the results of two expeditions against the same foe, same objective, same environment, but with two very different results.

Context: The War

Background: Conflict in North America between the British and the French was not new in 1755. War amongst the European colonies had been a part of life in North America from the first settlements in the 17th century. In the 150 years before the exchange of hostilities at the forks of the Ohio in the 1750's, France and Britain had fought over land disputes related to war in Europe on three previous occasions. The two countries fought in King William's War from 1688-1697, with each side conducting raids and capturing some territory only to have all the gains returned through the treaty of Ryswick. The next round was Queen Anne's War, 1702-1713. During this nine-year war, both the French and British attempted to expand their

territories for trade and settlement and thus gain a superior foothold in North America. Despite, territorial gains by both sides, the Treaty of Utrecht that ended hostilities returned land and sought to balance the power on the continent. Historian Walter Borneman commented: “The resulting Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 had many provisions, but the chief result was to keep any one empire from dominating. In North America this meant that France yielded toeholds to England in Nova Scotia, in Newfoundland, and on the southern shores of Hudson Bay.”⁵ War arrived on the continent again in 1740 with the beginning of hostilities during the War of Austrian Succession, 1740-1748 (King George’s War). The eight years of warfare included the British colonists capturing the French fortress port of Louisburg in 1745. To their dismay, the war ended with the treaty of Aix – la – Chappelle, which in North America returned the situation to a prewar status, to include the formidable fortress at Louisburg given back to the French. The treaty brought only a temporary peace, as expansionist feelings led to friction between New France and the English colonies; ominously, this also included the numerous native tribes in North America.

Both the French and the British sought to expand their interests in central North America, especially the unsettled Ohio valley region. The French intended to connect their colonial holdings by linking Canada and Louisiana through the region, primarily by small-garrisoned trading posts. The French also had such posts south of the Ohio River (See Appendix B). The British colonies following the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had similar expansionist aims as the French, especially for the Ohio country. Unlike the French, who viewed North America primarily more for its trade, the British were using the continent for settlement to include westward expansion by Virginia (whereas Pennsylvania initially viewed this area as profitable for trade). Population figures demonstrate the difference in intentions. “The census of 1754

showed about 55,000 white inhabitants in Canada, plus perhaps another 25,000 in Acadia and Louisiana. By comparison, the English colonies boasted an estimated 1,160,000 white inhabitants, plus some 300,000 black slaves.”⁶ However, unless westward expansion occurred, the English colonies were wedged between the Atlantic Ocean and Appalachian Mountains, with the only possible direction of expansion west toward French claimed and weakly held territories. Thus, each country’s goal for territorial expansion put them on collision course in the Ohio frontier that would lead to war.

Another complicating factor existed – indigenous peoples also lived in and claimed these territories with the various tribes having their own interests, thus the third and largely forgotten players in hostilities in North America were the Native Americans. The indigenous tribes of North America were as significant a part of the operating environment and setting as the British and French colonies. By the end of 1748, these tribes served as a buffer between the French and the British empires. With both the British and the French vying for land and power in their traditional land, the native tribes would serve as an important ally or foe - and ultimately be a determining factor between victory and defeat.⁷

Clashes of Empire in the Ohio Valley: The race for the Ohio valley region began in the summer of 1749. French Captain Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville embarked on expedition to stake the French claim to the Ohio valley. He traveled throughout the Ohio valley planting metal markers embossed with the French monarchy’s coat of arms in the ground and on the trees.⁸ Despite these claims, the British continued to populate the area. In response, the French dispatched an expedition to build a system of forts in the area to force out British traders and settlers. As Borneman notes, “On August 28, 1753, they seized the trading post at Venango on

the Allegheny River that Englishman John Fraser had quietly reoccupied following Celoron's visit four years ago.”⁹

The British colonial governors also responded by dispatching a diplomatic mission to inform the French that they were in British territory and request they abandon their forts. The man the governors chose to deliver the message was George Washington. Washington arrived at Fort Le Boeuf in December of 1753. The French declined the British request to leave the Ohio valley. As Washington departed for Virginia to relay the French response, he observed French preparations for the upcoming spring. Historian Fred Anderson writes, “Washington had seen canoes and bateaux on the banks of the river and in the woods near Fort Le Boeuf, hundreds of them: a clear indication that next stage of the French occupation would be to build a fourth fort, at the forks of the Ohio, in the coming year.”¹⁰

In early 1754, the British began construction on a fort of their own at the forks of the Ohio. The French, aware of the construction, quickly acted. As British military historian Sir John Fortescue writes, “Forty men were actually at work on it when, on the 17th of April, a flotilla of small craft came pouring down on the Allegany with a party of five hundred French on board. The troops landed, trained cannon upon the unfinished stockade, and summoned the British to surrender.”¹¹ The British detachment quickly surrendered. “At daybreak next morning, the fleur-de-lis was hoisted, and 50 men went into the woods with felling axes, to bring out logs and timbers which to build Fort Duquesne.”¹²

George Washington and a Virginia colonial militia regiment were then dispatched to respond to the French intrusion. The regiment departed Wills Creek, Virginia on May 10 for Fort Duquesne. Fortescue described Washington's actions: “Washington though but half his

troops had yet joined him, presently advanced over the Alleghenies to the Youghiogany, a tributary of the Monongahela; and there on the 27th of May he came upon a small party of French and fired the shots which began the war.”¹³ Washington and his men ambushed what turned out to be a French diplomatic party en route to Virginia. The leader of the detachment was a French Troupes de la Marine officer, Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville. Jumonville was wounded in the exchange. One of the Indians with Washington executed the injured Jumonville, escalating the significance of the event. Washington and his men, anticipating a counter attack from French troops at Fort Duquesne, retreated to an area called the Great Meadows and constructed a temporary structure they named Fort Necessity. On July 3, the French force that Washington anticipated converged at Fort Necessity. Fred Anderson describes the events when he writes, “At eleven o’clock the French appeared-six hundred regulars and Canadian militiamen, together with a hundred Indian warriors, primarily Ottawas, Nioissings, and other allies from the Great Lakes-and launched the attack.”¹⁴ The next day, after a night of fighting off both the French attack and a heavy rainstorm, the Virginians surrendered. They were awarded the honors of war and allowed to return to Virginia.¹⁵ Thus, the first shots of the French and Indian war had been fired. The French retained control of Fort Duquesne and thus the Ohio valley.

The Objective: Fort Duquesne and French Forces (See Appendix C): Fort Duquesne, built on the eastern bank where the Allegheny River, Ohio River, and the Monongahela River convergence, dominated the most important terrain in the Ohio valley. Travel in western North America in the mid-18th century was primarily by water. Historian Walter O’Meara writes, “In all the vast expanse of forest beyond the Atlantic coastal range, there was nothing but a few dim Indian traces and game trails. So, wherever you went, it was by canoe, or pirogue or bateau.”¹⁶

By controlling this key junction, the French were able to control traffic East from Lake Erie, southeast from Virginia, and connect to the Mississippi River to the southwest. Historian Paul Kopperman described the importance of the fort, writing, “Fort Duquesne therefore stood as both a symbolic and a real citadel of dominion...As long as the fort stood unchallenged, it would bear witness to French predominance on the Ohio, to their power to protect the tribes which went to war on their behalf-and to punish those which sided with the enemy.”¹⁷ Structurally, the fort was not particularly imposing. John McKinney, an American who was held captive at the fort in 1756, later described it: “It is four square, has bastions at each corner; it is about fifty yards long and about forty yards wide....there are entrenchments cast up all around the fort about 7 feet high.”¹⁸ Constructed to hold a capacity of only 300 men, the fort would quickly house many more as relations between the French and British continued to deteriorate.

At the beginning 1755, the French detachment at Fort Duquesne numbered roughly 250 Frenchman and 100 Indians. Responding to previous perceived British intrusions, the French government dispatched reinforcements to Canada, with 2600 French regulars landing in June. As a result, Fort Duquesne’s strength doubled, reaching 500 regulars and Canadian militia. The French commander, Captain-Pierre Pecaudy de Contrecoeur, augmented his small detachment with nearly 1000 native allies.¹⁹ These Indians warriors would play a significant role in the defeat of Braddock’s forces.

The Physical Environment: Between the British in Virginia and Fort Duquesne in the Ohio Valley lay some of the most challenging and unforgiving terrain in North America. The route prescribed to Braddock by the British civilian authorities followed the same route George Washington had taken in 1753. It was nothing more than an 110 mile Indian hunting and

trappers supply trail that cut through the dense forest of western Virginia and Pennsylvania and climbed over Allegheny Mountains. The trail was not large enough to sustain an proposed major expedition. To accomplish a goal of capturing the Fort Duquesne, the British would be forced to build a road through the Virginia and Pennsylvania forest and over the mountains and rivers. Thus, logistical support and planning would be crucial to the success of the expedition.

British Response I: General Braddock and Operational Failure (1755)

British Response: Responding to the events in the Ohio valley, the British civilian authorities in London devised a plan to quickly regain the initiative in North America and gain possession of Fort Duquesne. This called for the British to conduct a four-pronged assault, attacking Fort Duquesne, Fort St. Frederick, Fort Niagara, and the French in Acadia. However, the seeds for failure were sown as the civilians in London designed the operational plans for North America. Walter O'Meara writes, "It was an admirable simple and comprehensive plan, but it had a fatal flaw: the planners had never been in America, were ignorant of its geography, and hence were utterly incapable of visualizing the special problems of wilderness warfare."²⁰ Moreover, even with their ignorance of the environment in North America, the British authorities went even further and planned the sequence of events. As Paul Kopperman notes, "They dictated the approximate plan of march and specified not only that Fort Duquesne must be taken, but that is must come first."²¹ The man selected to carry out this plan, assigned as the overall commander in chief in North American and selected to personally lead the expedition against Fort Duquesne was General Edward Braddock.

The Commander: Edward Braddock (See Appendix D): The commander plays the most important role in the analysis of the operational environment and adaption. The commander and

his experiences contribute greatly to how he views the environment and is able to adapt. When he arrived in Virginia in 1755, the sixty-year-old Edward Braddock had spent 46 years in service to the British crown, joining the army at the age of 15. Despite spending nearly a half century in the British army, Braddock may not have been the most appropriate choice to lead such an important military expedition in the challenging environment of North America. He had never been to the colonies, and as Paul Kopperman notes, “Braddock was yet to serve in battle.”²² Braddock’s personal secretary, William Shirley, son and of the same name of the Governor of the Massachusetts, questioned the general’s qualifications: “We have a general most judiciously chosen for being disqualified for the service he is employed in almost every respect.”²³ Braddock had a strong personality that contributed to his inabilities to adapt and to gain allies. As the insightful Benjamin Franklin commented, “‘this general was, I think, a brave man, and might probably have made a good figure in some Europe war. But he had too much self-confidence; too high an opinion of the validity of regular troops; too mean a one of both American and Indians.’”²⁴ Sir John Fortescue further described Braddock as “rough, brutal, and insolent, a martinet of the narrowest type, but wanting neither spirit nor ability, and brave as a lion.”²⁵

Operational Overview: On February 1755, six months after being appointed the commander of British forces in North America, General Braddock arrived at Hampton Road, Virginia. In March, two regiments of British regulars, the 44th and 48th Regiments, arrived from Ireland. On May 10, the expedition was staged and conducting final preparations at Fort Cumberland, Virginia. Braddock’s force consisted of 2,100 British regulars and colonial militia, and eight Indian warriors. On May 29, the lead elements of it, to include the road building crew, advance scouts, and Indian guides, departed Fort Cumberland. By June 10, all of Braddock’s force was

moving toward Fort Duquesne. Due to the construction of the road, the pace was slow. Braddock, concerned at the slow speed of the expedition and worrying that French reinforcements would arrive before he would, decided to act. On June 17, after holding a council of war to seek the recommendations of his officers, Braddock made the decision to split his forces. Historian Thomas Crocker writes, “He would establish a ‘flying column’ of hand-picked troops to sprint to Fort Duquesne and lead the assault.”²⁶ The column to lead the attack on Fort Duquesne included 1,200 of Braddock’s best men, his artillery, and the necessary supply wagons. The rest of the command, about one third, and all the heavy baggage, would follow in trace and move as fast as it could.

Moving at a quicker pace, the lead elements of Braddock’s force reached the site of Washington’s defensive stand at Fort Necessity on 25 June. The force crossed the Youghiogheny River on the June 28 and bivouacked at Salt Lick camp on July 3. On July 6, the column was within 20 miles of Fort Duquesne and by the night of July 8 was within six miles of its objective. In the predawn hours of July 9, Braddock’s advance party crossed the Monongahela River and secured the route for the main body. At dawn, Braddock and the main body crossed the Monongahela ready to lay siege to the outnumbered garrison at Fort Duquesne. However, the French, knowing no siege by the British could be withstood, decided to act. Historian Armstrong Starkey described the French action, noting, “The French commander Pierre de Contrecoeur therefore sought more favorable battle conditions and dispatched a mixed force of 208 regulars, 146 militia, and 600 Indians, who intercepted Braddock shortly after the British safely forded the Monongahela river.”²⁷

The French forces first encountered the British advance party with the sides exchanging volleys. The initial shots killed the French commander and caused confusion amongst the French troops, but their Indian allies quickly moved into a position of advantage. As Fred Anderson notes, “They dispersed into the woods on both sides of the road and began picking off the scarlet-coated enemy.”²⁸ The British advance party retreated, but soon collided with the main body that was moving forward toward the gunfire. “Tangled in confusion on a road little more than twelve feet wide, the British made a splendid, defenseless target. Unable to see the Indians who sniped at them from cover, the British troops fought as best they could, directing volleys into the woods-and also, all too often, into one another.”²⁹ For the next three hours, under an intense rifle fire, the British bravely stood their ground but to no avail. Forced to retreat, Braddock had lost 500 men killed whilst he had been mortally wounded, eventually dying four days after the battle. The remnants of the expedition retreated to Fort Cumberland, thus ending in a stunning defeat in North America. How is this to be explained?

Failure: Understanding the Character of Warfare: General Edward Braddock’s most egregious operational planning mistake was his inability to understand the enemy and the character of the war that his men would encounter in North America. A career soldier of European orientation, Braddock arrived in North America determined to conduct war the way he had been trained in for so many years. Unfortunately, the woods of Pennsylvania were not the fields of Flanders. The enemy, the frontier French forces, and their Indian allies fought a different type of warfare. The British army that embarked to capture Fort Duquesne was not prepared because Braddock, during his operational planning, failed to understand his enemy or their type of warfare, failed to take heed of colonial input and recommendations, and was too

rigid and inflexible his ways. Braddock's errors in planning resulted in confusion, tragedy, and death at the forks of the Monongahela.

The foe that stood opposite the British and colonials in the wilderness of Pennsylvania was not the parade ground European trained regulars to which Braddock was accustom, but a hardened and experience mixture of men that had mastered their trade in the wilderness and borderlands of North America. The enemy at Fort Duquesne was composed of French regulars, Canadian militia, and Native American warriors allied with the French. It was these last two groups which had mastered frontier fighting. Through necessity, the frontier style of warfare was not that of Europe's massed formations and drill. It had evolved into a style adapted because of the environment of North America. The wilderness terrain, small numbers, and Indians tribes forced a different way of fighting to that of standing European armies. As Starkey notes, "By the 1690's the French had learned the lessons of frontier war in the hard school conducted by the Iroquois. Canadian officers and militiamen, veterans of western fur trading expeditions, became expert frontier warriors."³⁰

While the French regulars and Canadian militia provided expertise and a proficiency at North American warfare, their small numbers over vast spaces limited their influence. The French turned to the native Indian tribes to increase their numbers and capabilities. Through regular trading, gift giving, and alliances, the French gain support of strategically located Indians tribes. As Starkey writes, "Indian alliances were the most important military asset possessed by the French Empire in North America."³¹ The Indians provided the French the enhanced ability for intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, and fighting during movement. Most importantly, the

Indians provided a boost in manpower, allowing the French to mitigate the differences in troops population bases and troops strengths from Britain and initially their colonies.

While it could not be expected that Braddock would understand North American warfare or the style that the French were inclined to fight upon his arrival to Virginia, it might be expected that he would have studied the enemy and his tactics. Braddock's greatest resource to understand them lay with the colonials. Unfortunately, Braddock did not respect the colonials experience enough to give credence their recommendations. George Washington had previously faced the French and their Indians allies in two different incidents in 1754 and was a possible source of information on the frontier fighting. Washington, the commander of the Virginia militia, had had experience in frontier warfare, and enjoyed a personnel relationship with Braddock serving on the general's staff. Despite this, Braddock disregarded Washington's advice. Historian Ron Chernow writes, "Washington tried to impress upon him the improvisational tactics of the French and Indians, but the haughty general wouldn't deign to accept colonial advice."³² Braddock further demonstrated his arrogance and inflexibility in a discussion with Benjamin Franklin. Franklin tried to warn the general about the different type of tactics the Indians might employ. Braddock smugly responded, "these savages may be a formidable enemy to you and your raw American militia, but upon the king's regular and disciplined troops, sir, it is impossible they would make any impression."³³ Colonial counsel was thus ignored. Braddock was inflexible and unable to listen to anyone who disagreed with him. As Fred Anderson writes, "Braddock had little time for anyone who did not see the campaign as he did: that is, as a contest between French and British forces, distinguishable from any similar clash in Europe only by the smallness of the forces involved, the remoteness of the setting, and the uncommon difficulty of operations."³⁴

Braddock's inflexibility in planning before the expedition manifested itself with deadly results on July 9. With his men pinned down by the lethal French and Indian fires, Braddock had failed to adapt and kept his men formed. There is no question that the men caught between the cross fire surrounded by enemy fought bravely. Once the French and Indian bullets started raining down, the British and the provincials, stood their ground, and fought gallantly for three hours. Unfortunately, standing their ground was all they had been trained to do. Braddock by then had no alternatives. In order to keep control of the situation, Braddock reverted to his men's training even if it was flawed for the situation. The late 19th century historian Francis Parkman described the scene: "A few of the regulars also tried to in their clumsy way to fight behind trees; but Braddock beat them with his sword, and compelled them to stand with the rest, and open mark for the Indians."³⁵ The move only further contributed to the massacre of his men. Walter O'Meara further reinforced Braddock's inflexibility when he wrote, "This was not war, certainly, as Braddock had ever known it. It was a war, nevertheless, that had to be fought; and Braddock waged it the only way he knew how – by the book."³⁶ The debacle outside Fort Duquesne reflected the clash of two very differently trained foes. As Starkey notes, "Regulars and militia trained in conventional European tactics were no match for the masters of forest war."³⁷ Braddock's lack of understanding of the type of warfare he had to fight led to his disastrous defeat and for him his death.

Braddock: Failed Diplomacy: His long career in the British Army did not prepare Edward Braddock for the diplomatic challenge he would face in North America. In April, he gathered the colonial governors at a meeting in Alexandria, Virginia to garner support for the military operations. Oblivious to the political environment in the colonies and the necessity to build a coalition of support amongst them, Braddock articulated his demands to the governors rather

than reason or seek counsel from them. Fred Anderson describes the interaction: “He accordingly showed less interest in learning about the temper of their colonies’ assemblies or readiness of the colonist for war than in instructing the governors in their responsibilities, as if they were so many subordinate commanders.”³⁸ The governors in turn were reluctant to support Braddock’ demands. As a result, Braddock’s ability to attain logistical supplies and financial support suffered.

Braddock’s failure at diplomacy also affected his Indian support. When his expedition departed Fort Cumberland on May 29 en route to Fort Duquesne, it did so with only the support of eight Native American scouts! This minimal support of the native Americans was a contributing factor to the defeat of the British. Throughout the long march to Fort Duquesne, French and Indian raiding parties continually harassed Braddock’s movement. The absence of native American warriors to serve as scouts and flank security during the attack left the British vulnerable.

During the three months leading up to the commencement of his expedition, Braddock had an opportunity to gain significant support from the tribes for his expedition and possibly swinging the momentum in favor of the British. Unfortunately, his lack of political acumen, prejudice, and cultural ignorance robbed his expedition of any significant Native American support and strengthened wavering Ohio Indian support for the French. At Fort Cumberland in May, while preparing his forces for the upcoming expedition, Braddock had considerable interaction with the Native Americans tribes in hopes of garnering support for the upcoming campaign. His biggest mistake occurred during a meeting with a delegation of six chiefs of the Indian tribes that lived in the Ohio region along expeditions’ route and near Fort Duquesne.

Frustrated with the French and their allied Indians, the chiefs were ready to pledge their assistance to the British. The Ohio Indians had come for Braddock's support and were offering their own support in return. To show their commitment to the British cause, the Indians presented Braddock with a diagram of the defenses of Fort Duquesne smuggled out by one of the Indians himself. As historian Fred Anderson notes, "The general, in his ignorance, entirely disregarded it."³⁹ Braddock's response to the gift offended the chiefs. It set the tone for the rest of the meeting and demonstrated his arrogance and utter disregard toward the Indians as potential allies.

Braddock's ignorance and arrogance continued. The chiefs asked Braddock what his intentions were for the Ohio region if the British won. His arrogant response, "that the English should inhabit and inherit the land."⁴⁰ The chiefs' queried further, asking, "Would he at least allow the Indians to live among the English...and leave them sufficient hunting grounds to support their families?" Braddock again replied, "No savage should inherit the land."⁴¹ Even with this response, the chiefs' desired to agree to a deal. They returned the next day with hopes of a different outcome and again asked Braddock if his intentions for the land included concessions to their tribes. As Fred Anderson notes, "Braddock, however, understood neither how much he needed the Indians nor how much they wanted his aid in establishing their independence."⁴² He thus again reiterated his statements from the day before. With his statement, the majority of the Ohio Indians departed vowing not fight alongside a man who treated them so disrespect. In fact, some of these Indians fellow tribesman would participate in the ambush of Braddock at the Monongahela. These tragic sequences of events nearly ended all of the British hopes of having substantial Indian support for the expedition.

A second episode demonstrated Braddock's cultural ignorance and lack of interest in the Indians who withdrew their support. While still at Fort Cumberland, Braddock became concerned that they were interacting too closely with his men. He especially worried that the presence and allure of the Indian woman brought unwanted breeches in his army's discipline. His worries were founded in reality. On several occasions, his men were found illegally trading with the Indians and some were involved in relationships with the native woman. In an attempt to maintain his army's discipline, Braddock expelled the Indian women and children to a distant trading post. In doing so, Braddock committed an error in judgment, for he also believed the warriors would remain and assist on the expedition. However, as Walter O'Meara concluded, the move "so incensed the Indians, so desperately needed as scouts and guides," the Indians warriors left to be with their families and did not return.⁴³

Through his lack of understanding toward the Indians and his ignorance of the situation, Braddock lost most of the warrior support. The expedition thus departed with only eight Indians serving as scouts. Meanwhile, Indians raiding parties harassed the army's column and ambushed Braddock's men as they near Fort Duquesne. Fred Anderson strikingly noted, "The ambush included a large amount of Shawnee, Delaware, and Mingo fighters."⁴⁴ The presence of the Shawnee, Delaware and Mingo tribes was significant, as they were the same tribes that Braddock failed to accommodate during the diplomatic conference in May.

Braddock: Failed Logistics: Braddock's expedition to capture Fort Duquesne was a monumental undertaking. It called for organizing, training, and leading an expedition of over 2000 men and camp followers, supplies and materials nearly 110 miles through the vast unsettled Virginia and Pennsylvania wilderness across rough and imposing mountainous terrain. If his

forces captured Fort Duquesne, his troops needed to be able to hold the area and be prepared to conduct follow on operations. Despite the requirements, Braddock was not able to plan a thorough and comprehensive logistical plan to support his operations. Braddock's planning suffered due to the predetermined route, limited assistance from the colonial population, and a lack of planned logistical support bases.

The British civilian authorities in London made the most significant error associated with the logistical plan to support Braddock's expedition. As Sir John Fortescue wrote, "A great initial blunder had been made by the military authorities in England in sending the troops to Virginia and ordering them to advance on the Ohio by the circuitous route from Wills' Creek."⁴⁵ The selection of this prescribed route caused considerable logistical difficulties that effected the expedition. In Virginia, the expedition had trouble finding supplies for the army that delayed the expedition for nearly six weeks. The Virginia colonial government, along with other colonial governments, was not as supportive because they believed that the British, not the state governments as Braddock had requested, should fund the expedition.⁴⁶ In the end, it took a Pennsylvanian to come to the rescue for Braddock. Responding to a plea of assistance by the General, Franklin went to Pennsylvania and returned with the necessary supplies to begin the expedition.⁴⁷

Trying to follow a strict schedule in order to arrive at the forks of the Ohio before the French could reinforce the fort, General Braddock made a decision in his logistical planning that would have fateful consequences. The timeline had his expedition arriving in late June or early July. Because of this, Braddock decided to forgo establishing forward supply bases or forts, which could have provided the needed logistical and supply requirements. In doing so, he again

neglected counsel, in this case from his own quartermaster, Captain John St. Clair, who recommended that intermediate supply bases built to sustain the troops. St. Clair, in a letter following the expedition, stated his recommendations were “often laughed at on account of the time and Expense they must take up.”⁴⁸ St Clair described the ramifications of this decision later in the same letter: “We went then upon unhappy supposition of Certain success, and that it depended upon our presence only, without the formality of observing Military precautions and the Dictates of Common Sense.”⁴⁹

As Braddock’s expedition advanced, building a road across the wilderness, the task of supporting the army became difficult. The expedition moved slowly, progressing only 20 miles in ten days.⁵⁰ By not establishing intermediate support bases along the route of movement, Braddock left his line of communication unsecure. It also meant that he had to travel with all of his logistical support he needed for the entire expedition. This restricted his movement so severely that finally he made a fateful decision. After holding a council of war with his subordinate commanders, Braddock decided to split his force in order to make better time. He decided to advance forward toward Fort Duquesne with two-thirds of his force and leave the remaining one-third to secure the baggage and supplies. The move greatly diminished the expedition’s combat power and would have grave results when they encountered the enemy.

The absence of a string of intermediate bases ultimately cost the expedition time and reduced its effectiveness. It slowed Braddock’s force, thus denying them the ability to build speed and tempo. The lack of bases also forced Braddock to dedicate a portion of his force to guard his supply train and protect his lines of communications. It also denied the expedition an area to prepare for the final attack on Fort Duquesne or, in case of defeat, a place to retreat and

regroup. Instead, the British were divided, tired, and worn down when they began their final movement on July 9. When Braddock finally gave the order to retreat in the late afternoon, the retreat proved to be a grueling three-day movement back to where the expedition began, Fort Cumberland.

Braddock: Failed Intelligence: Braddock's expedition also was hindered by a lack of consistent and accurate intelligence of its opponents and the attributes of Fort Duquesne; he had to rely on the eight Indian scouts with him to provide intelligence gathering during the expedition. The absence of a large number of Indian scouts degraded Braddock's ability to understand the changing operational picture as his expedition cut its way through the forest. To make matters worse, Braddock's own Indian scouts provided only limited intelligence gathering. As the expedition neared the objective, Braddock wanted the Indians to push forward and collect intelligence on Fort Duquesne, but the warriors would not do this. Historian Rene Chartland writes, "General Braddock was anxious to have his allied Indians 'go toward the fort for intelligence' especially as they had declined to scout for the last eight days. He tried again with promises and presents, but to no avail; they would not go out. Thus, the Anglo-American army was practically blind."⁵¹ Braddock's inability to understand both the theatre environment and the specific enemy he was facing led to his splitting his forces with the main element being ambushed on the morning of July 9.

Conclusion and Effects: Besides the humiliation and the loss of life the British experienced at the Monongahela on 9 July, they also ceded the initiative to the French. Following the defeat, the British ended their campaign against Fort Duquesne, withdrew from the Virginia and Pennsylvania frontier, and entered winter quarters. With the absence of the British, the French

unleashed their Indian allies on the British settlers in Pennsylvania and Virginia colonies for the next three years.⁵² The British operations in North America also stalled, not achieving a significant victory until the capture of Louisburgh and Fort Frontenac in the summer of 1758. The French thus remained supreme in of the Ohio area, free of British intervention for the next three years. Left unanswered: could the French maintain this position, especially if a different type of British commander directed operations against them?

British Response II: Forbes' Expedition Operational Success (1758)

After Braddock's defeat, the British presence in the Ohio valley was nonexistent. During that time, the French and the Indians conducted major raids against the Virginia and Pennsylvania settlers. As Francis Parkman emotionally proclaimed, "Fort Duquesne, the source of all the evil, was left undisturbed."⁵³ By 1758, reeling from dismal defeats during the first three years of the war, the British changed strategies. The new British Prime Minister, William Pitt, shifted the main effort towards Canada. The operations focused on the Canadian strong hold at Louisburg, but also called for attacks against French forts in the Hudson River valley and against Fort Duquesne.⁵⁴ It would be Britain's third attempt at capturing the forks of the Monongahela. As O'Meara wrote, continuity and change were present: "it was the same old plan: the difference was that this time a man of flashing intellect, explosive energy, and spectacular oratorical power was in charge."⁵⁵ The man that William Pitt selected to lead the third attempt to capture Fort Duquesne was a General John Forbes. Unlike Braddock, Forbes would properly prepare his army for the North American style of warfare because he understood the enemy and the environment, and implemented a solid logistical plan and aggressively engaged in a training regime to prepare his men. The result of his understanding and his men's

hard work would be success: the capture of Fort Duquesne and the establishment of a permanent British presence in the Ohio Valley.

The Commander (See Appendix D): John Forbes entered service in 1729, first serving as an army surgeon and becoming a professional line officer in 1735. During the next 23 years, Forbes would see action in Europe, impressing his superiors and building a wide array of experiences. Historian Douglas Cubbison notes, “As deputy quartermaster general throughout several years’ campaigns in Europe, Forbes gained considerable logistical and transportation experience that was integral to his command responsibilities in Pennsylvania.”⁵⁶ In 1757, Forbes served in New York for the British overall commander, the Earl of Loudoun. From this perspective, Forbes was able to build an understanding of the British operational picture and better appreciate the challenges of the environment in Virginia and Pennsylvania. He learned what was important and what would work in North American. He adapted to the environment.

Operational Overview: In March 1758, the new overall British commander, General James Ambergcrombie, officially assigned Forbes the duties of commander of the expedition to seize Fort Duquesne. Without any regular troops assigned or provincial militia recruited for the operation until April, Forbes was able to access, analyze, and plan without being pushed by time. By the beginning of June, the force, totaling between six and seven thousand personnel including British regulars, provincial troops, wagoners and camp followers, was on the move from Lancaster to Carlisle, Pennsylvania.⁵⁷ From this initial supply base at Carlisle, Forbes followed an existing trail westward, improving it as his expedition proceeded. The expedition camped at Shippensburg, and then continued southwest 24 miles to Fort Loudoun. The road construction crew, followed by the main body, then continued north and crossed the Allegheny Mountains.⁵⁸

Arriving at Fort Lyttleton, Forbes chose to continue northwest through Pennsylvania instead of heading south toward Fort Cumberland on Braddock's road.

From Fort Lyttleton, Forbes men moved west to Ray's Town and established their rear base of operations.⁵⁹ Also from Ray's Town, the expedition scouted a route and cut a new road through the dense Pennsylvania forest and over the Allegheny Mountains. By August 20, the British reached the Loyalhanna Creek and commenced construction on the fort they would name Fort Ligonier. This new post, 47 miles from the objective, would be the final staging point and support center for operations against Fort Duquesne. On September 14, in response to several raids against Fort Ligonier by Indians allied with the French, Major James Grant with 750 British and provincial troops attacked Fort Duquesne. The French repelled the assault, killing or capturing nearly 300 of the attackers. A month later, trying to maintain the initiative and raid British supplies, the French launched an attack against Fort Ligonier, but this was repulsed. With winter nearing, Forbes received accurate intelligence of the French composition and defenses at Fort Duquesne. With the information, he decided to attack Fort Duquesne. The French commander, with his manpower and resources low, decided to abandon the fort, destroying it as he and his men departed. On November 24, the British saw the smoke plumes rising over the fort and by the next day, took control of the area - now finally in possession the forks of the Ohio.

The Objective: Fort Duquesne and the French: In the spring of 1758, while Forbes was preparing his expedition, the French commander, De Ligneris, welcomed reinforcements to Fort Duquesne. Nearly 1000 Canadian militia arrived from the Illinois and Great Lakes regions.⁶⁰ Throughout the summer the numbers rose, reaching a peak strength of 3500 French and Indians.

As the summer faded to fall however most of the forces disappeared. The militia from Illinois and Detroit left to make the trek back to their homes for the winter, while the Indians then slowly departed following the French defeat of Grant's assault. By November, De Ligneris was short on supplies and had approximately only 300 men, with few Indians allies, to defend the fort.

Comprehending the Environment: Physical Setting: On 31 July, as his expedition was completing construction on the supply base at Ray's Town, Forbes made the decision to cut a new road west through Pennsylvania to Loyalhanna. He chose this article instead of using Braddock's road in Virginia. Forbes based his decision on his knowledge of the physical environment, to include the distance to Fort Duquesne. As Douglas Cubbinson writes, "According to Forbes, from Ray's Town to Fort Duquesne using Braddock's road required a march of approximately 160 miles. From Ray's Town to Fort Duquesne by way of Loyalhanna was about ninety miles."⁶¹ Terrain encountered also influenced Forbes decision. As Cubbinson also notes, "Using Braddock's road would add five major water crossings that had to be executed, and high water at any one of these locations could seriously delay the entire army. A direct route across the Allegheny Mountains west from Ray's Town had no major water crossings to execute."⁶² Forbes also understood the psychological negatives associated with route: if his expedition used his predecessor's road, it would pass through the site where the 1755 battle had occurred. Still visible at the site were the bones and remnants of Braddock's men. Cubbinson writes, "The demoralizing effect that this would have upon Forbes's soldiers could not be discounted."⁶³ Because he understood these aspects of the operating environment, Forbes was able to make the decision that best supported his plan and its execution.

Comprehending the Environment: The Character of Warfare and Adapting: Forbes had the luxury of having been in North America for nearly a year prior to planning and executing his operation. In that time, he had gained a valuable appreciation for the differences in the type of warfare between Europe and the new world. In addition, by studying Braddock's letters and reports, and by talking with men who survived the Braddock's defeat, Forbes better understood how the French and the Indians would fight. He realized that the French were reliant on the indigenous tribes, and that countering the Indians, both their irregular tactics and raiding parties, would be his biggest challenge. Expecting to face similar harassment, raids, and ambushes that Braddock's force had experienced, Forbes adapted. As Armstrong Starkey writes, "He realized that his men must learn the Indian way of war, at least enough of it to survive in the forest."⁶⁴

To implement the training of his men, Forbes also had a luxury that Braddock did not, an experienced second in command with whom he could rely on: Lieutenant Colonel Henry Bouquet. LtCol Bouquet, the commander of one of the expeditions' units, the First Battalion, Royal American Regiment, was an experienced Swiss born officer who had gained valuable experience during the Austrian War of Succession that prepared him for service in North America. Douglas Cubbinson, describing Bouquet experiences in Europe notes, "Much of the Sardinian Theatre of this war occurred in the mountains of Northern Italy, and provided Bouquet with valuable experience in warfare in rugged terrain roughly similar to the Allegheny Mountains of Pennsylvania."⁶⁵ Bouquet would be the man to whom Forbes turned for the training his men in frontier style warfare. Walter O'Meara described Bouquet's expertise, "He not only knew the theory of war, but quickly adapted it to bush fighting and became, in the end, a wilderness campaigner without peer."⁶⁶

Forbes, with assistance from Bouquet, implemented tactics, techniques, and procedures that reinforced the principles of frontier warfare. As Borneman described, the tactics included, “Occupation ‘of all suspected places....where ambuscades may be concealed’ and that ‘in case of an attack the men must fall on their knees; that motion will prevent their running away, and in covering them from fire, shall give time to reconnoiter and to make the necessary dispositions.’”⁶⁷

To survive in the forest, Forbes and Bouquet ensured their men could effectively fight back.

Instead of relying on massed volleys from formed troops, they implemented a thorough individual marksmanship-training program. The training evolved beyond just target practice. As Douglas Cubbinson noted, they required the men to ““practice firing at marks, and of taking their stations behind trees.””⁶⁸ Forbes and Bouquet’s also stressed the practical application of drills before they would have to use against the enemy. They believed that the training must not only be conducted inside the confines of the secure areas, but outside in the environment in which they would be employed.⁶⁹ During the movement to Ray’s Town, Bouquet employed flanking parties advance to the rear of the advancing columns to warn against and protect against the expected Indians raids.

Forbes was keenly aware of the time of the year in relation to the use and affectability of Indians and changed his operational timetable against the French. Forbes consciously delayed his final push to Fort Duquesne until the month of November to coincide with the Indian pre-winter hunting season. That time also ensured less foliage on the trees thus making it harder for the French and the Indians to conceal an ambush. In his journal, Forbes addressed these issues: “Because of the trees losing their leaves, by which one can see a little thro’the woods, and prevent the Enemy surprizes, which is their only strength, and likewise, that in those months the

Indians left the French as it is their chief hunting season, in which they provide for their families during the winter.”⁷⁰

Basis of Success: Logistics: The luxury of time allowed Forbes to plan properly the logistical and supply support for his expedition, and he used it wisely. He understood the end state of his expedition was to cross the Pennsylvania wilderness, capture Fort Duquesne, and then be able to hold the position for follow on operations if needed. To achieve this, Forbes knew he had to develop a plan to logically support his force. This included selection of the base of operations, a route to take, and the construction of intermediate support bases to sustain his expedition. As Cubbinson summarized, “Forbes intended to establish an adequate road that could sustain a garrison at Fort Duquesne once the post fell to British arms. The construction of storehouses, depots, and magazines along with entrenched positions to defend from, would necessarily occupy many months and occasion much effort.”⁷¹

The first and most significant decision Forbes made was the selection of his base of operations: he decided on the city of Philadelphia. The fact that Forbes had the ability to make his own choice differed drastically from the limitations placed on Braddock three years earlier when the British ministers in London determined Braddock’s use of Alexandria, Virginia and Fort Cumberland. Philadelphia, conversely, was a great selection. Cubbinson writes, “Philadelphia was the single most prosperous and busiest port in North America.”⁷² Hence, Forbes had access to ample amounts of supplies to stockpile for the upcoming expedition.

The choice of Philadelphia as a base of operations then influenced the selection of the route to be taken to Fort Duquesne. Forbes had two options: Braddock’s road or a new road through Pennsylvania. Many in the state of Virginia, to include one of Forbes brigade

commanders, George Washington, lobbied heavily for the use Braddock's road, while those in Pennsylvania favored a route through their commonwealth. Forbes was not swayed by the biased political rivalries of the colonies. Historian Nick Anderson thus described Forbes decision making: "Forbes...merely wanted the best military road to Fort Duquesne and the best supply route after its capture, however it might run."⁷³ In the end, the commander selected the Pennsylvania route because it provided access to more supplies and was the most direct route toward his objective.

With his base of operations and the route selected, Forbes planned the support of his movement. He was determined not to make the same mistake as Braddock. Due to time constraints, Braddock failed to build intermediate bases to support his logistics plan. In contrast, Forbes directed the establishment of a forward base at Carlisle and then the use of Fort Loudon on the edge of Allegheny Mountains. He then built a string of intermediate bases to house his supplies and to secure his line of communication back to Philadelphia.⁷⁴ From Fort Loudon, Forbes movement continued west using the existing structure at Fort Littleton as a small supply base. The expedition then built Fort Bedford at Ray's Town. Fort Bedford would serve as the expedition's main staging, training, and logistics area for the expedition. In August, Forbes men continued west and constructed Fort Ligonier. Fort Ligonier, 47 miles from Fort Duquesne, served as the final staging base for the final assault on the objective. Forbes' movements were slow, careful, and, most importantly, properly prepared the expedition for the final assault on Fort Duquesne.

Forbes construction of bases for support led to success. The validation of this came at one of the lowest times during the expedition. In October, after repeated harassment from

French raiding parties, Forbes and Bouquet decided to regain the initiative and strike at Fort Duquesne. The officer chosen to lead the attack was Major James Grant. Leading a party of 800 men, Grant attacked Fort Duquesne on the morning of September 14. However, the French were ready and nearly 800 Indians and French met the British outside Fort Duquesne, routed the attackers and captured Grant. The effects of Grant's defeat were mitigated because of Forbes' planning. As Walter O'Meara writes, "Even a defeat could have a bright side. This one had proved his system of strong forward bases a sound one: Grant-unlike Braddock-had something, at least, to fall back on."⁷⁵ Thus, the remaining 500 of Grant's troops made it safely back to Fort Ligonier. One month later, on October 12, a combined French and Indian force 600 strong, attacked Fort Ligonier. In a furious daylong battle, the British skillfully repelled the assaults and regained the momentum. This success would not have been possible had Forbes not planned for logistical support, to include well-constructed posts along the route.

Basis for Success: Intelligence: Forbes's expedition also enjoyed a greater intelligence gathering capability than Braddock had because of more Indians to scout and the ability to send out patrols from the logistical bases. The warriors that accompanied the expedition effectively served as the eyes and ears for the expedition, gaining vital information on the French situation at Fort Duquesne. As Cubbinson summarizes, "Forbes was able to slowly but surely gain a picture of conditions at Fort Duquesne, and unlike Braddock three summers earlier, he was wrestling the initiative from the French by sending his own raiding parties regularly against their fort. These efforts also kept the Cherokees and Catawbas remaining with Forbes gainfully and apparently quite happy."⁷⁶

The greatest source of intelligence Forbes received throughout the expedition came on November 12 about a French raiding party. As Cubbinson writes, “British scouts, whether Native American or provincials is unknown, detected the approach of this raiding party and altered the main garrison at Loyalhanna.”⁷⁷ Knowing this, Forbes dispatched a detachment of colonial militia to intercept them, which they did, repelling the raiders and taking prisoners. One of the prisoners, an Englishman who had deserted from the British army and joined the French, provided information on the defenses of Fort Duquesne, to include the strength of the garrison and amount of supplies. Douglas Cubbinson notes, “The information was but four days old, so it was current. Forbes knew that only two hundred French regulars were at the fort...the garrison was low on food...and was contemplating abandoning the fort.”⁷⁸ With this intelligence, Forbes decided to assault Fort Duquesne as soon as possible. In summary, this intelligence capability provided Forbes and Bouquet a better understanding of the environment as they methodically trekked across the Pennsylvania wilderness.

Basis for Success: Diplomacy: As Forbes began planning for his expedition; he quickly learned to appreciate the vital need for indigenous support. While other British commanders looked at Indian support as simply a tactical advantage, Forbes saw them as so much more. Fred Anderson described Forbes vision, writing, “He was virtually unique among them [other British commanders] in that he grasped the strategic importance of the Indians.”⁷⁹ Forbes comprehended the importance of the tribe’s role to his future success against Fort Duquesne. He also understood that Braddock’s defeat was due in part to the lack of Indians support. Forbes especially comprehended that the French relied so heavily on Indian allies. Thus, by successfully negotiating with them, he could severely degrade French capabilities while also increasing his own. With these observations, Forbes aggressively recruited Indians allies for his

expedition through establishing diplomatic relationships and solutions to pressing issues with the Ohio tribes.

Forbes aggressively recruited the native warriors to serve in his expedition.

Understanding their value, he devoted ample assets to acquire and keep their support. Forbes presented the Indians gifts and presents varying in greater degrees depending on the event or the success on a mission. His initial efforts were successful with the arrival of over 300 warriors in the early spring of 1758. Unfortunate for the British, the warriors became impatient at the slow pace of the expedition and most of them returned home before it began. By the time Forbes and his men departed for Fort Duquesne, there were 50 warriors serving with the army. This amount would remain constant throughout the expedition with neither any major additions nor defections. While not as many as he would have liked, the 50 warriors were effective in supporting the expedition. Historian David Preston succinctly states the difference the Indian made: “Forbes was not as blind in the woods as Braddock had been.”⁸⁰ In doing so, he used the native warriors for intelligence gathering, scouting, and protecting his armies’ flanks. He also used them to harass the French. Cubbinson writes, “As a result, Forbes’ army sustained relatively minor annoyance by the French and hostile Indians, and managed to completely deceive the French and Indians to the location of his army until Grant’s advance upon Fort Duquesne in September.”⁸¹

Forbes understood Braddock’s errors in diplomacy with the Ohio Indians in 1755 and vowed not to make the same mistake. He made diplomacy with the Ohio Indians part of his overall campaign plan. He also understood that without their support his expedition would be as vulnerable as Braddock’s. Forbes knew that if he could enter into a treaty with the Ohio Indians,

he would deny the French the only asset that that allowed them to neutralize British superiority on the battlefield. Fred Anderson writes, “Arranging this treaty was a task to which Forbes applied himself with not less determination than to building the road itself.”⁸²

Forbes’ plan to enter into a treaty with the Indians of the Ohio valley began in the spring of 1758 before his expedition departed en route to Fort Duquesne. Unofficially using the Eastern Delaware Chief Teedyuscung as an emissary, he opened communications with the tribes. Official negotiations commenced in June after Forbes received authority from General James Ambergcrombie, the British Commander in North American, to conduct diplomatic exchanges with the Ohio valley tribes. Forbes also employed the Pennsylvania Governor, William Denny to meet with the tribes and negotiate terms.

The negotiations continued throughout the summer and into the fall. In October, with his army staged at Fort Ligonier and preparing for their final assault against Fort Duquesne, the emissaries were successful in convening a peace conference. On October 11, 1758, the conference at Easton began. Thirteen different tribes were present. During the negotiations, the Indians were well aware of the methodical pace and detailed planning Forbes expedition had taken, and how it greatly differed from that of Braddock’s. The Indians saw this as a sign of Forbes’ future success. Negotiations continued for nearly three weeks as the tribes and the British envoys discussed the British intentions and Indians rights.

Finally, on October 26, 1758, the sides agreed to terms. The thirteen native tribes agreed to end their support of the French during the current hostilities. In return, the British recognized Indian hunting rights in the Ohio valley and, most importantly, pledged not build any permanent settlements west of the Alleghany Mountains. The effects were seen quickly. Walter Borneman

described the aftermath: “When word of it spread westward and reached Fort Duquesne, those Ohio Indians who had been allies of the French for more than three years quickly melted away into the forest.”⁸³ The significance of the treaty and its effects on the outcome of the expedition were not lost on Bouquet. In a letter to friends following the capture of Fort Duquesne, he credited Forbes efforts when he wrote, “After God the success of this Expedition is entirely due to the General, who by bringing about the Treaty of Easton, has struck the blow which has knocked these French in the head...”⁸⁴

General Forbes aggressive recruitment and diplomatic persistence to gain the support of the Indians tribes and deny their support to the French was the one of the most significant contributions to success of his expedition. The Indian warriors that accompanied Forbes provided his army with the intelligence, enhanced offensive capabilities, and the necessary ability to move methodically through the Pennsylvania wilderness without being effected by warring parties. It also denied the French their most important ally, the Ohio tribes.

Conclusion: Relevance Then and Now

The British army executed two expeditions to capture Fort Duquesne and seize the strategically important forks of the Ohio River. However, the two commanders planned the expeditions quite differently. General Braddock’s 1755 failure was due to his inability to understand the character of the hostilities into which he was entering, his inability to acquire Native American support for his expedition, and his failure to plan logically and gain intelligence in support of expedition. General Forbes expedition, launched three and one-half years later, had the luxury of studying Braddock’s defeat and he was able to learn from it and successfully plan his own. Forbes success was due largely to his ability to understand the type of

warfare in the borderlands and prepare his men to engage in it, his ability to recruit and diplomatically engage the Ohio tribes, and to plan a logically sound campaign.

As the United States military enters its 12th year of conflict in the war on terror and looks to a future of uncertainty in diverse areas of the world, the next major operational environment will be complicated and confusing. The two British campaigns to capture Fort Duquesne are an exemplary study for military professionals. They highlight the necessity to understand the theatre, the terrain, the enemy, potential allies and the necessity for logistical and intelligence considerations in planning. It is essential for a commander and his/her staff to gain appreciation for such operational environments so they can accurately plan and effectively execute. They must also be flexible enough to adapt their tactics and procedures in order to be successful. Without this, a failed future commander might be uttering words similar to that of Edward Braddock after the battle of the Monongahela and just prior to his death, “Another time we shall know better how to deal with them.”⁸⁵

Endnotes

¹ United States Army, “Field Manual 1-02.” *Operational Terms and Graphics*, (2 February 2010), 1-138.

² United States Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 5-1.” *Marine Corps Planning Process*, (24 August 2010), 2-2.

³ United States Army, “Training and Doctrine Command, Pamphlet 525-3-0.” *U.S. Army Capstone Concept*, (19 December 2012), iii.

⁴ Ibid, 11.

⁵ Walter Borneman, *The French & Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America*. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2006), 7.

⁶ Ibid, 12.

⁷ Fred Anderson in his books, *The War that made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War* and *Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of the Empire in British North America, 1754-1766*, discusses as a central theme the role of indigenous peoples in the balance of power up to and in the war.

⁸ Borneman, 15.

⁹ Ibid, 18.

¹⁰ Fred Anderson, *The War that made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War*. (New York: Viking, 2005), 42.

¹¹ Sir John William Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*. (Vol. II. Ams Press, 1917), 272.

¹² Walter O’Meara, *Guns at the Forks*. Vol. 152. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 52.

¹³ Fortescue, 272.

¹⁴ Anderson, *The War that made America*, 50.

¹⁵ The surrender document that George Washington signed was written in French – a language he did not know. In what he signed, Washington unknowingly acknowledged attacking and killing the French emissary.

¹⁶ O’Meara, 55.

¹⁷ Paul E. Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela*. (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992), 20.

¹⁸ O'Meara, 67.

¹⁹ Ibid, 136.

²⁰ Ibid, 110.

²¹ Kopperman, 7.

²² Ibid, 15.

²³ Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe: The French and Indian War*. 1 Da Capo Press ed. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1983), 144

²⁴ Ibid, 144

²⁵ Fortescue, 274.

²⁶ Crocker, 179.

²⁷ Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare 1675-1795*. Vol. 5, (University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 95.

²⁸ Anderson, *The War that made America*, 70.

²⁹ Ibid, 70.

³⁰ Starkey, 98.

³¹ Starkey, 86.

³² Ron Chernow, *Washington: A life*. (New York: Penguin Press, 2010), 54.

³³ Ibid, 54.

³⁴ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of the Empire in British North America, 1754-1766*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 106.

³⁵ Parkman, 163.

³⁶ O'Meara, 130.

³⁷ Starkey, 95.

³⁸ Anderson, *The War that made America*, 61.

³⁹ Ibid, 67.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 69.

⁴¹ Ibid, 69.

⁴² Ibid, 67.

⁴³ O'Meara, 124.

⁴⁴ Anderson, *The War that made America*, 70.

⁴⁵ Ibid, 278.

⁴⁶ The colonial governments continued to resist full cooperation with the British war efforts until 1757 when William Penn became the Prime Minister. Penn changed the policy, thus London paid for the war effort instead of the colonial government.

⁴⁷ Parkman, 150.

⁴⁸ Douglas Cubbison, *The British Defeat of the French in Pennsylvania, 1758: A Military History of the Forbes Campaign Against Fort Duquesne*. (McFarland, 2010), 36.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 36.

⁵⁰ O'Meara, 130.

⁵¹ Rene Chartrand, *Monongahela 1754-55: "Washington's defeat, Braddock's disaster"*. Vol. 140. (Osprey Publishing, 2004), 58.

⁵² Borneman, 153.

⁵³ Parkman, 439.

⁵⁴ O'Meara, 185.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 185

⁵⁶ Cubbinson, 9

⁵⁷ Parkman, 440.

⁵⁸ Cubbinson, 67.

⁵⁹ O'Meara, 187.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 192.

⁶¹ Cubbinson 89

⁶² Ibid, 89.

⁶³ Ibid, 90

⁶⁴ Starkey, 99.

⁶⁵ Cubbinson 13

⁶⁶ O'Meara, 188

⁶⁷ Borneman, 155.

⁶⁸ Cubbinson, 53-54.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 54.

⁷⁰ Cubbinson, 38.

⁷¹ Ibid, 37

⁷² Ibid, 36.

⁷³ Niles Anderson, The General Chooses a Road: The Forbes Campaign of 1758 to Capture Fort Duquesne. *The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* 42, no. 2-4, (1959): 111

⁷⁴ Cubbison, 36.

⁷⁵ O'Meara, 202.

⁷⁶ Cubbinson, 120.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 155

⁷⁸ Ibid, 155

⁷⁹ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 268.

⁸⁰ David L Preston, "Make Indians of our White Men: British Soldiers and Indian Warriors from Braddock's to Forbes's Campaigns, 1755-1758." *Pennsylvania History* 73, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 280-306.

⁸¹ Cubbison, 84.

⁸² Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 268.

⁸³ Borneman, 164. The fact that the terms of the Forbes negotiated could not, and were not, subsequently fulfilled does not negate what he knew was important in order to be successful - nor his sincerity in concluding the terms in the Treaty of Easton.

⁸⁴ Cubbinson, 196.

⁸⁵ Fortescue, 285.

⁸⁶ Borneman, xxiv.

⁸⁷ O'Meara, 117.

⁸⁸ The State Society of the Cincinnati of Pennsylvania,
<http://pasocietyofthecincinnati.org/CinnWeb/images/PA/FortPittBLG.jpg>

⁸⁹ Google Maps, <http://maps.google.com/>, March 20, 2013

⁹⁰ Google Maps, <http://maps.google.com/>, March 20, 2013

⁹¹ Crocket, 25-35.

⁹² O'Meara, 117.

⁹³ Cubbinson, 8-10.

⁹⁴ O'Meara, 117.

⁹⁵ Ibid, 117.

⁹⁶ Cubbinson, 13.

⁹⁷ Crocker, 177.

⁹⁸ Rene Chartrand, *Tomahawk and Musket-French and Indian Raids in the Ohio Valley 1758*. Osprey Publishing, 2012). 24

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Appendix A

Chronology of Events

1688-1697 - King William's War

1702-1713 – Queen Anne's War

1740-1748 – War of Austrian Succession

1748

18 October – Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle ends War of Austrian Succession

1749

July 30 to August 31 – French Captain Pierre-Joseph Celoron de Blainville buries six metal plates in the Ohio country, claiming the land for France.

1753

March to October – Paul Marin de la Malgue leads a French expedition to seize English trading post in the Ohio country.

11 December – George Washington arrives at Fort Le Boeuf with diplomatic message from the Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia claiming Ohio country for the British.

1754

28 May – British and Indians under George Washington ambush a French diplomatic party resulting in the Jumonville affair.

4 July – George Washington surrenders Fort Necessity

15 September – General Edward Braddock appointed Commander in Chief – North America

1755

8 June – British capture Fort Beausejour

9 July- Braddock expedition defeated at the Monongahela

8 September – Battle of Lake George

1756

17 May – British formally declare war on France

9 June – France formally declares war on Britain

14 August – French capture Forts Ontario, Oswego and Pepperell

1757

9 August – French capture and destroy Fort William Henry

1758

8 July – French repel British attack against Fort Ticonderoga (Carillon)

27 July – British capture French ports Louisburg

27 Aug – British capture Fort Frontenac

24 November – Fort Duquesne is abandoned by the French

1759

26 July – British capture Fort Niagara

26 July – Fort Ticonderoga is abandoned by the French

31 July – Fort St. Frederic is abandoned by the French

17 September – British capture Quebec

1760

28 April – British repel French attack at Quebec


8 September – French surrender Montreal

1763

10 February – Treaty of Paris signed formally ending hostilities.

Appendix B


Map North America circa 1754




The map depicts the string of fortification in North America circa 1754. The French appeared strong and to be encircling the thirteen British colonies on the Atlantic Coast. The logical question: Were they indeed in a position of strength, and could it be maintained? ⁸⁶

Appendix C


Sketches and Photos of Fort Duquesne



The above picture is the only known French plan of Fort Duquesne circa 1755.⁸⁷



This map depicts both Fort Duquesne and Fort Pitt. Notice the differences in size.⁸⁸



The above is an aerial view of Point State Park in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The white outline on the left is Fort Duquesne. A portion of the much larger Fort Pitt is on the right.⁸⁹



This is an aerial view the site of Fort Duquesne. Notice the size of the fort in relation to the car and truck at the bottom of the picture.⁹⁰

Appendix D

Biographical Sketches of Key Players



General Edward Braddock⁹²

General Edward Braddock

Edward Braddock was born in 1694 to a military family. His father was an officer in the Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards, eventually rising to the rank of Major General. Edward joined his father's unit as an ensign in 1710. His early years in the British army consisted primarily of guard duty for the British royal family in London. His guard duties continued until 1746, when as a newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel, Braddock traveled to the low countries during War of Austrian Succession, but did not see any combat. He bought his colonelcy in 1753, and gained command of the British garrison at Gibraltar. Braddock was promoted to Major General in 1754 and later that same year placed in command of all British troops in North America. He died on July 13, 1755 following the failed expedition to capture Fort Duquesne.⁹¹

General John Forbes

General John Forbes was born in Scotland in 1707. He joined the Royal Regiment of the Royal Dragoons in 1729 as surgeon. He earned his commission as a line officer in 1735 and served in the War of Austrian Succession where he participated in numerous combat engagements. His stellar performance earned him promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and appointment as deputy quartermaster in 1745, and command of the Scots Greys in 1750. He was selected to serve as the commander of the 17th Regiment Foot in 1757, and subsequently adjutant to the British commander in chief in North America, Jeffrey Amherst. In early 1758, the British Prime Minister, William Pitt selected Forbes to command the expedition to seize Fort Duquesne. Forbes died in March 1759, following his forces successful capture of Fort Duquesne and was buried in Philadelphia.⁹³



General John Forbes⁹⁴



Henry Bouquet⁹⁵

Henry Bouquet

Henry Bouquet was born in Switzerland in 1719. He joined the military at the age of 17 and subsequently earned a commission in 1739, while serving in a Swiss regiment in the Sardinian military. Bouquet distinguished himself in during the War of Austrian Succession, ultimately rising to the position of regimental adjutant. Following the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, he traveled Europe, eventually joining the Prince of Orange of Holland's army and then the English army in 1756. During his service for England, Bouquet traveled to North America as the commander of the Royal American Regiment. In addition to serving as Forbes second in command against Fort Duquesne, Bouquet also led British operations during the Battle of Bushy Run. He suddenly died in 1765 from yellow fever.⁹⁶

Appendix E

Chronology of Braddock's Expedition

1754

15 September – British appoint General Braddock as Command in Chief of North America

22 December – Braddock and his primary staff depart England for North America

1755

15 January – 44th and 48th Regiments depart Ireland for North America

20 Feb – Braddock and staff arrive at Hampton, Virginia

3 April – Braddock meets with colonial governors.

March – 44th and 48th Regiments arrive in North America.

29 May – Expedition departs Fort Cumberland, Maryland

7 June – 44th Regiment departs Fort Cumberland, Maryland

8 June – Provincial Companies depart Fort Cumberland, Maryland

10 June – 48th Regiment departs Fort Cumberland, Maryland along with General Braddock and his staff.

16 June – Braddock calls a council of war and requests George Washington his opinion in a private meeting.

18 June – Braddock splits his forces and proceeds toward Fort Duquesne with 1200 troops


9 July – Braddock's force crosses the Monongahela River and are ambushed and defeated by French and Indians. The remaining British begin retreat back toward Fort Cumberland.

13 July – Braddock dies from wounds suffered on 9 July

17 July – British forces arrive back at Fort Cumberland

Appendix F

Map of Braddock's Expedition



The above picture depicts Braddock's route of march in 1755. The absence of logistical supply bases along the route contributed to the expedition's disaster. Also, notice the demanding physical environment they encountered along the way. ⁹⁷

Appendix G

Chronology of Forbes Expedition

1758

14 March – Forbes is promoted to Brigadier General and appointed commander of the expedition to capture Fort Duquesne.

18 April – Forbes arrives in Philadelphia to begin planning and preparation for the operation.

29 April – Three companies of Highlanders depart Philadelphia and travel 66 miles to Lancaster.

11 June – British store ship with ordnance arrives in Philadelphia.

12 to 14 June – Highlanders travel 57 miles from Lancaster to Carlisle.

25 July – The remaining portions of the expedition depart Carlisle for Shippensburg.

24 June – Lead elements of the expedition reach Ray's Town, later named Fort Bedford.

23 July – Ambergromby authorizes Forbes to negotiation directly with Ohio Indian tribes.

31 July – Forbes decides to construct road through Pennsylvania instead of using the existing Braddock road through Virginia.

20 August – British begin construction on facility at Loyalhanna, later named Fort Ligonier.

9 September – Bouquet sends a 750-man detachment under Captain Grant to reconnoiter Fort Duquesne.

14 September – Grant's attack on Fort Duquesne is repelled resulting in 300 British killed, wounded, or captured.

26 October – The Treaty of Easton is signed ensuring the neutrality of the Indian tribes in the Ohio region.

23 November – The remaining French soldiers at Fort Duquesne destroy the fort and retreat to Fort Machault.

25 November – The British take control of Fort Duquesne.

28 November – Men from Forbes expedition properly bury remains from Braddock's found near Fort Duquesne.


4 December – Forbes departs Fort Duquesne for Philadelphia.

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11 March – General Forbes dies in Philadelphia and is interred in Christ Church.

Appendix H

Map of Forbes Expedition



The map above traces the Forbes route through the Pennsylvania wilderness in comparison to Braddock's earlier expedition. Notice Forbes' strategic placement of logistical support bases to sustain his expedition.⁹⁸